



Department of State
RELEASED IN PART, B1,A5

TELEGRAM

(E46)

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AN: 0830761-1027

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----372643 261210Z /21

P 261150Z DEC 83
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6158
INFO ANEMBASSY ABU DHABI

- ANEMBASSY AMMAN
- ANEMBASSY ANKARA
- ANEMBASSY CAIRO
- ANEMBASSY DAMASCUS
- ANCONSUL JERUSALEM
- ANEMBASSY JIDDA
- ANEMBASSY LONDON
- ANEMBASSY MUSCAT
- ANEMBASSY OTTAWA
- ANEMBASSY PARIS
- ANEMBASSY TEL AVIV
- ANEMBASSY TOKYO
- USELO RIYADH
- USMISSION USNATO
- JCS WASHDC
- ANEMBASSY ROME
- USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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EXDIS CAPTION REMOVED BY S/S (EK) ON 11/29/93

DEPT PASS S/SN TOM MILLER

EO12356 DECL OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IZ, US, XF
SUBJ: FOLLOW-UP ON RUMSFELD VISIT TO BAGHDAD

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
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2. DECEMBER 26, I CALLED ON UNDERSECRETARY SAHHAF AT

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DATE: JAN 13 1994

157 F.C.I. CDR

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

TS authority to
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THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO COMPARE NOTES ON AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S VISIT AND FOLLOW-UP ON SOME SPECIFIC POINTS. SAHHAF'S OPENING COMMENTS CONFIRMED OUR OWN IMPRESSION FROM A NUMBER OF OTHER SOURCES THAT THE VISIT WAS VERY FAVORABLY RECEIVED IN IRAQ BOTH BY THE GOVERNMENT AND THE IRAQI PUBLIC. SAHHAF NOTED THE GOOD ATMOSPHERE DURING THE VISIT AND THE WIDE CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS.

3. DRAWING ON PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT, I BEGAN BY REFERRING TO OUR RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN THE GULF. SAHHAF INDICATED THAT HE WAS UP ON THIS THROUGH THE REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF IRAQINT AFTER HIS BRIEFING BY THE DEPARTMENT. I RECALLED THAT ALL GULF STATES HAD SHOWN AN INTEREST IN CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS, WITH SEVERAL MORE INTERESTED IN MILITARY ASPECTS THAN OTHERS. SAHHAF, WITHOUT COMMITTING HIMSELF, CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION THAT IRAQ IS PLEASED WITH THE INTEREST WE ARE SHOWING IN THE GULF.

4. AS THE CONVERSATION MOVED TO STEPS WE ARE TAKING WITH OUR FRIENDS TO STOP MILITARY SALES TO IRAN, SAHHAF EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S SATISFACTION. HE SEEMED PARTICULARLY PLEASED BY MY REPORT THAT AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD FAVORED DISCUSSING THE ISSUE WITH OUR FRIENDS IN STRATEGIC TERMS RATHER THAN LIMITING OURSELVES TO TRYING TO INTERDICT SPECIFIC SHIPMENTS THAT MIGHT COME TO OUR ATTENTION.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO END THE WAR, SAHHAF REFLECTED IRAQ'S CONTINUED FRUSTRATION WITH THE LACK OF PROGRESS. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE UN/SYG WOULD BE ATTENDING THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT AT CASABLANCA BUT THIS WAS USUALLY A PROTOCOLAR APPEARANCE RATHER THAN

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ONE DEALING WITH SUBSTANCE. SAHHAF CONFIRMED OUR IMPRESSION THAT IT WILL NOT BE KNOWN UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE WHETHER OR NOT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL ATTEND THE MEETING.

6. OUR DISCUSSION OF THE GULF WAS LARGELY IN TERMS OF IRAQI PETROLEUM EXPORTS. I NOTED THAT, WHILE WE SUPPORTED PIPELINE PROJECTS THAT WOULD EVENTUALLY HELP TO REDRESS THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN IRAQ'S AND IRAN'S EXPORTS, WE WONDERED WHETHER IRAQ WAS NOT INTERESTED IN TESTING IRAN'S INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO IRAQI USE OF THE GULF. SAHHAF ACKNOWLEDGED THAT [REDACTED] TOO WERE INTERESTED IN THIS

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POSSIBILITY, BUT HE OBSERVED, AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY, THAT IRAQ DID NOT KNOW WHAT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS MIGHT HAVE TO BE OVERCOME, INCLUDING CLEARANCE OF WRECKS AND MINES. I REPLIED THAT WE TOO, WERE IN THE DARK ON A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL QUESTIONS RE IRAQ'S ABILITY TO DELIVER OIL TO A GULF TERMINAL. THIS LEAD TO MY SUGGESTION THAT WE BE PLACED IN CONTACT WITH IRAQI OFFICIALS WITH WHOM WE COULD DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS IN MORE DETAIL.

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7. IN CONVEYING THE HIGH LEVEL US INTEREST IN IRAQ'S
ECONOMIC SITUATION, I ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR
ME TO MEET WITH FIRST DEPUTY PREMIER TAHA YASSIN RAMADHAN
(WHO IS IRAQ'S ECONOMIC CZAR). I NOTED THAT IN ADDITION
TO DISCUSSING ECONOMIC MATTERS IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR US

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TO COVER A WIDER RANGE OF ISSUES TO HELP ESTABLISH
CONFIDENCE, [REDACTED]

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8. SAHHAF SMILED AND REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE KNEW THAT TAHA YASSIN RAMADHAN'S CONTACTS WITH EASTERN BLOC WERE HIGHLY VISIBLE, IRAQ NOW FINALLY HAD A COMPLETELY UNIFIED LEADERSHIP. RESPONDING POSITIVELY TO THE IDEA OF A MEETING, SAHHAF SAID I WOULD FIND RAMADHAN'S VIEWS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF TARIQ AZIZ. HE THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT BEFORE SUCH A MEETING TAKES PLACE, WE SHOULD TRY TO HAVE SOME SPECIFIC PROJECTS OR PROPOSALS TO DISCUSS. I REPLIED THAT, THOUGH IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE SUCH ITEMS ON THE AGENDA, WE SHOULD PERHAPS APPROACH NEXT STEPS IN A DIFFERENT WAY. THE USG HAD CONCLUDED A HIGH LEVEL POLICY REVIEW WHICH HAD ESTABLISHED THE ENVIRONMENT AND POLICY POSITIONS THAT HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK IT NOW SEEMED APPROPRIATE FOR THE IRAQIS TO COME FORWARD WITH SOME SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS. THESE COULD BE CONVEYED AT VARIOUS LEVELS, BUT A MEETING WITH RAMADHAN WOULD OBTAIN HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON AND WOULD SET THE STAGE WITHIN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FOR CLOSER ECONOMIC COOPERATION. SAHHAF SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS AS THE CORRECT APPROACH.

9. COMMENT: AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S VISIT HAS ELEVATED US-IRAQI RELATIONS TO A NEW LEVEL. THIS IS BOTH SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT AND PRACTICALLY HELPFUL. ON THE STRATEGIC LEVEL THIS NEW RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN USEFULLY REGISTERED BY OUR FRIENDS, AND PROBABLY BY IRAN AND SYRIA AS WELL. WITHIN IRAQ, THE VISIT HAS BEEN OBSERVED BY THE BUREAUCRACY AND IT WILL IMPROVE OUR ACCESS HERE. WE MUST NOW MAINTAIN SOME MOMENTUM IN THE DIALOGUE AND

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RELATIONSHIP. A MEETING WITH TAHA YASSIN RAMADHAN, THOUGH NOT ESSENTIAL, WOULD BE ONE WAY OF DOING SO AND WOULD BE A FURTHER POSITIVE SIGNAL TO IRAQIS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO HAVE OPPOSED THE US. DESPITE SAHHAF'S CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY, WE BELIEVE TAHA YASSIN RAMADHAN HAS IN THE PAST BEEN UNENTHUSIASTIC TOWARD IMPROVEMENT OF US-IRAQI RELATIONS.

10. COMMENT CONTINUED: DURING AND FOLLOWING THE RUMSFELD VISIT WE HAVE RECEIVED NO COMMITMENT FROM THE IRAQIS THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM MILITARY MOVES TOWARD ESCALATION

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IN THE GULF. NEVERTHELESS, THE RELATIONSHIP BEING ESTABLISHED WITH THE US MAY HAVE A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP, PERHAPS CAUSING THEM TO PAUSE AND GIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE HOPE FOR A FORUITOUS DEVELOPMENT IN TEHRAN MORE TIME. THE IRAQIS, HOWEVER, DO NOT CONSIDER ATTACKING SHIPS IN THE EXCLUSION ZONE NEAR BANDAR KHOMEINI TO BE AN ESCALATION. EAGLETON

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